Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2010

How Must a Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley and Wendel
David Luban
Georgetown University Law Center, luband@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/366

23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1101-1117 (2010)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal History Commons

GEORGETOWN LAW
Faculty Publications

Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 10-26
May 2010

How Must a Lawyer Be?
A Response to Woolley and Wendel
23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics (forthcoming, 2010)

David Luban
Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center
luband@law.georgetown.edu
This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/366/
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1614949
Posted with permission of the author

How Must a Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley
and Wendel
Forthcoming, 23 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics (2010)
DAVID LUBAN 
Alice Woolley and Brad Wendel tackle an important but
underdiscussed problem in legal ethics: the problem of connecting
normative theories about professional duties with a plausible psychology
of action. As they felicitously put it, legal ethics must answer not only
questions about what a lawyer must do, but also questions about how a
lawyer must be—their shorthand, I take it, for “how a lawyer must be in
order to do what (according to the theory) a lawyer must do.” They
plausibly suggest that ethical theories offer not only maxims of obligation
and moral reasoning, but also idealized portraits of the moral agent.
Actions that come easily to one personality type may be excruciatingly
painful or embarrassing to another. Once we notice this crucial connection
between actions and personality, we open up a new dimension for
evaluating the theories: evaluating the portrait of the moral agent implicit
in the theory.
Viewed in this light (they argue), theories of legal ethics that might
otherwise seem plausible can fail if they turn out to require lawyers to be
an implausible kind of person, in one or more of the following ways:
someone who is a misfit in the professional settings in which lawyers
ordinarily work; someone who must possess cognitive capacities and
moral virtues at an unrealistically high level; or someone whose overall
personality turns out to be morally undesirable. Here I am paraphrasing
the three criteria Woolley and Wendel specify for evaluating conceptions
of how a lawyer must be: “whether that conception is functional, realistic
or desirable.” 1
Using these criteria, they raise doubts about the theories of William
Simon, Charles Fried, and me. According to Woolley and Wendel,
Simon’s theory requires lawyers who are mavericks, and my theory
requires lawyers who are (excessively?) moralistic; both are highly
individualist to an extent that might make the legal profession impossible
to regulate, and both require lawyers who are unusually smart and
unrealistically free from cognitive biases. Fried’s theory, on the other
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hand, requires lawyers whose combination of moral skepticism,
institutional complacency, and uncritical loyalty to clients may be morally
undesirable. 2
Embedded in Woolley and Wendel’s critique of Simon, Fried, and me
is their own picture of “how an ethical lawyer should be.” Woolley and
Wendel are particularly concerned with the regulation of the legal
profession, and thus with lawyers’ attitudes toward law in general,
particularly toward professional regulations. That attitude should be, in a
phrase Wendel has used elsewhere, one of “civil obedience.” 3
Intellectually, the lawyer should be a master of the law of lawyering:
disciplinary rules, tort and agency rules, and agency regulations of lawyer
conduct. She should recognize professional duties as obligations of
political morality, not individual morality. 4 And she should obey these
duties, even if they conflict with her own moral convictions. In other
words, she should be law-abiding as a matter of political principle.
Transposing this requirement into the psychological categories Woolley
and Wendel favor, it appears that she should be emotionally identified as a
citizen first and a moralist second; and, further, that she should be
temperamentally capable of suppressing her urge to pass moral judgment.
It would be interesting to ask the same questions of Woolley and Wendel’s
ideal lawyer that they ask about Simon, Fried, and me; that is beyond the
scope of this paper, though, and I will content myself with responding to
their criticisms.
In the comments that follow, I first discuss Woolley and Wendel’s
three criteria for evaluating “how a lawyer must be.” Woolley and
Wendel do not explain the connection between these criteria, nor whether
the criteria are consistent with each other, nor whether they are
independent of each other. In my view, asking whether a conception of the
moral agent is functional, realistic, or desirable are quite different
questions. In Section I, I discuss the criterion of realism, under two
possible interpretations: that a conception of a moral agent is unrealistic if
it is, quite literally, impossible for agents to fulfill, and that the conception
is unrealistic if it is merely difficult to fulfill. I argue that neither Simon’s
conception nor mine is impossible, and that being difficult to fulfill is not
in itself a legitimate reason for rejecting a conception of moral agency.
This section concludes by contrasting my conception of ethics as choice
under the practical assumption of human freedom with Woolley and
Wendel’s more deterministic approach.
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In this response I shall have nothing to say about Woolley and Wendel’s discussion of
Fried. My focus is on their discussion of my own view and Simon’s view, which are
much nearer to each other than either is to Fried’s.
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Section II takes up the issues of functionality and desirability. I argue
that neither Simon’s theory nor mine requires a lawyer with a
dysfunctional or undesirable personality. In the conclusion, I speculate
that focusing (as I do) on the ethical demands of professional life, without
discussing the many other dimensions of being human, may make a theory
sound more relentlessly moralistic than it really is. A book exclusively
devoted to ethics is not an assertion that ethics is our exclusive devotion.
I. “REALISTIC”
A. “BEING UNREALISTIC” UNDERSTOOD AS IMPOSSIBILITY

Start with the requirement of realism, about which I shall have the
most to say. At one point, Woolley and Wendel ask whether Simon’s
theory and mine are “the equivalent of wanting basketball players who are
12 feet tall.” 5 In an obvious way, any ethical theory must be at least
minimally realistic: it cannot require the impossible—the meaning of
Kant’s famous maxim that “ought” implies “can.” 6 A moment’s thought
shows that this maxim applies not only to the physical possibility of doing
what the moral theory says we must do, but also to the intellectual
possibility of carrying out the kind of deliberation the theory asks of us,
and the emotional possibility of motivating ourselves to do what we ought.
At the very least, “ought implies can” means that a moral theory must
not be too computationally complex for the human brain. Woolley and
Wendel worry that William Simon’s account of legal ethics—which
apparently requires sophisticated legal analysis at every turn—might place
unrealistic cognitive demands on lawyers. As Woolley and Wendel note,
“Simon’s lawyer is very much intended to be the counterpart to Dworkin’s
ideal judge Hercules, who is called upon to construct a coherent politicalnormative account that explains and justifies the holding in any given
case.” 7 That means that the good lawyer, for Simon, is “a person of
awesome cognitive capabilities.” 8 Some years ago, I voiced a similar
concern about Simon’s theory. 9 But obviously Simon’s approach is not
literally impossible in the sense of being too computationally complex for
5
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KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, at 289, *8: 287 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996)(1793) [hereinafter PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY]. Kant doesn’t use the
modern “ought implies can” formulation, which first appeared in Sidgwick’s The
Methods of Ethics (1st ed. 1874).
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the human mind. The analyses Simon offers in The Practice of Justice are
complex to roughly the extent that an exam answer in a law school class
on labor law or tax policy is complex. To determine whether (in Simon’s
example that Woolley and Wendel borrow) union busting by a university
is substantively unjust, the university’s counsel needs to analyze the
purposes and policies behind statutes and apply her analysis to the
university’s situation. In my earlier paper about Simon, I worried that it is
unrealistic (meaning impossible) to expect super-sophisticated reasoning
from lawyers operating under deadlines. Simon actually agrees with this,
and argues that when the lawyer is operating under time or resource
constraints, she must fall back on “presumptive responses to broad
categories of situations.” 10
I am inclined to accept this response. Of course in the university
hypothetical, the lawyer almost certainly has time to think through
whether the representation is just; but, if she has not, a “presumptive
response” might be that union busting is almost certainly inconsistent with
the broad (and just) purposes of the National Labor Relations Act. Even
with such a presumption, the analysis of legal justice is not a trivial
exercise, but it is hardly above the pay grade of a university counsel who
works on labor-management issues. If, for example, her boss were to ask
her to produce a legal memorandum detailing the arguments the union
local might make if the case ended up in litigation, the lawyer would
probably come up with something very similar to Simon’s analysis.
Thus, Simon’s theory does not really require the impossible. But what
if it did, at least for some lawyers? Suppose that some lawyers simply
don’t have enough upstairs to successfully do the kind of analysis Simon
asks of them. Then, arguably, “ought implies can” mitigates moral
criticism for getting the wrong answer. 11 However, it doesn’t relieve them
of the obligation to try to figure out what substantive legal justice requires,
even if they get it wrong. Surely it is open to Simon to respond that he
offers his examples only as “model answers”; the injunction at the heart of
his theory is that lawyers should value substantive justice and aim to
figure it out using standard methods of legal analysis, not that they must
get the same answers Simon does.
B. “BEING UNREALISTIC” UNDERSTOOD AS PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTY

So much for the requirement that ethical theories must be rejected as
unrealistic if they ask the impossible; it is a valid criterion, but it does not
10

WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 157 (1998).
How much intellectual error mitigates blameworthiness is of course open to
debate. We usually do not accept the excuse of intellectual incapacity from
professional people (lawyers, doctors, engineers) when they malpractice; but we
might if getting the right answer demands extraordinary brilliance.
11
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rule out very much. But there is another, weaker sense of realism that
concerns difficulty rather than impossibility. This notion routinely
appears, for example, in public debates about how best to address the
social problem of teenage sex, pregnancy, and STDs. Some people
promote abstinence-only. Others criticize abstinence-only as unrealistic.
By “unrealistic,” the latter don’t mean that abstinence is physically or
cognitively impossible. What they mean is that abstinence is an uphill
struggle, uphill enough that abstinence-only education is likely to fail.12
Given the intensity of sexual desire, teens’ susceptibility to peer group
pressure, adolescent impulsivity, and Mother Nature’s hormone cocktail, it
is unrealistic to expect many teenagers to abstain from sex, even if in
some sense they agree with their high school teacher about the virtues of
abstinence.
Obviously, the difficulty of abstinence is not the same as literal
impossibility. Kant illustrated the difference with a characteristically
ghastly example:
Suppose someone asserts of his lustful inclination that, when the
desired object and the opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible to
him; ask him whether, if a gallows were erected in front of the house
where he finds this opportunity and he would be hanged on it
immediately after gratifying his lust, he would not then control his
inclination. One need not conjecture very long what he would reply. 13

This seems to be the main sense in which Woolley and Wendel use
the term “unrealistic”—not to assert that an ethical stance requires lawyers
to be something that is literally impossible for them to be, but merely that
it demands an uphill struggle. For example, they comment that Simon’s
requirement that lawyers should be committed to impartial justice “seems
rather unrealistic in a world in which both clients and law firms are
committed to a distinctive set of norms, not necessarily those of impartial
justice.” 14 Plainly they don’t mean that the human brain is incapable of
12

A recent study has apparently cast doubt on assertions that abstinence-only is doomed
to failure. Tamar Lewin, Quick Response to Study of Abstinence Education, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2010, at A18. Let me make clear that I am not taking sides in the debates over the
efficacy of abstinence education or the morality of teenage sex; I am simply using it as an
example.
13
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788), reprinted in PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 6, at 163, *5:30. Of course some might disagree as to the
predicted outcome, as Thom Gunn did in his very naughty little poem Courage, A Tale,
in THOM GUNN, COLLECTED POEMS 292 (1994).
14
Woolley & Wendel, supra note 1, at 18. On the merits, this remark seems a bit
question-begging against Simon — it assumes that other lawyers in the law firm are not
going to have the commitment to impartial justice that Simon commends; but of course
Simon is commending the pursuit of justice to all the lawyers in the firm, and the
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impartial justice (tell that to a judge, whose job description requires
impartial justice). They mean that it is unrealistic to expect lawyers to go
against the grain of the institutions in which they work and against the
clients who pay them.
This is where the psychological concepts Woolley and Wendel
invoke—not only cognition, but also “disposition or personality,” 15 or
again “emotion, dispositions, and virtue” 16 —come in. A morality that
requires people to act in a way that runs against the grain of their
dispositions, personality, or emotions is an unrealistic morality. It’s just
too damn hard. Or, flipping the argument around, a morality that requires
people to be the kind of person to whom such acts don’t run against the
grain is unrealistic if most of us are not that kind of person. Thus they
write, “It seems odd to ground a general theory of ethical lawyering,
intended to be applicable to all lawyers, on a complex of personal
characteristics that occurs only infrequently, in the form of exceptionally
courageous and individualistic people.” 17
I am not convinced that this is a legitimate way of criticizing a moral
theory, for several reasons. First, and most important, is that any
acceptable moral theory will be unrealistic in this sense. Consider the
famous Milgram experiments in social psychology, in which subjects are
set the task of punishing another subject with escalating electrical shocks
for getting wrong answers in a memorization exercise. In reality, the
shocks are fake and the other subject is a confederate of the experimenter;
the purpose of the experiment is to see how far people will go in following
a patently outrageous order. Milgram’s stunning finding is that almost
two-thirds of the subjects he tested went all the way to a seemingly-lethal
shock level (despite screams from the man at the other hand, pleas about
his heart condition, and eventual ominous silence). 18 The findings were
robust across many replications in many cultures.19 Apparently, most of us
problem of a lawyer going against the grain arises only when we assume a world in
which only a few lawyers adopt Simon’s approach to ethics while most of the lawyers
around them, including those in their firm, do not. Under that assumption, any system of
legal ethics will be unrealistic.
15
Id. at 4.
16
Id. at 5.
17
Id. at 33.
18
STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 56-57
(1974); see also ARTHUR G. MILLER, THE OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF
CONTROVERSY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1986). I analyze these experiments in some detail in
chapter 7 of DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 237 (2007), “The Ethics
of Wrongful Obedience.”
19
See MILLER, supra note 18, at, 86-87. The experiments seem to have leaked over to
popular culture, in unscientific replications of the Milgram experiment by TV producers
in the U.K. and France. See the British video at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y6GxIuljT3w; on the French version, see French
Contestants Torture Each Other on TV Game of Death, U.K. TELEGRAPH, Mar. 17, 2010,
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find it extremely difficult to disobey orders from an authority figure, even
when the orders are destructive and absurd.
A disquieting consequence of Milgram’s experiments is that any
morality that requires disobedience to authorities when they issue
destructive orders is, in the sense we’ve been discussing, “unrealistic”:
most people apparently find it excruciatingly difficult to disobey an
authority figure to his face. But any defensible morality will require
defiance under such circumstances. It follows that realism cannot, by
itself, be a criterion for judging ethical theories. Ultimately, the charge of
psychological unrealism is a legitimate objection to a moral theory only if
we have other, substantive grounds to doubt the theory’s prescriptions, as
we clearly do not when the prescription is “don’t inflict major damage on
an innocent person merely because your boss tells you that that is your
job.” Contrary to Woolley and Wendel, psychological realism is not an
independent evaluative ground for ethical theories.
A clarification is in order to distinguish the preceding discussion of
“unrealism” in ethics from a similar-sounding but actually quite different
debate familiar in the contemporary literature of moral theory. For four
decades, philosophers have debated the so-called “demandingness
objection,”, according to which it counts against a moral theory that it
places enormous demands on people. Bernard Williams originally raised
this as an objection to utilitarianism, which seemingly requires us to spend
every waking moment maximizing utility, leaving no space for projects
that matter to us simply because they matter to us. 20 The demandingness
objection often arises in discussions of our obligations to aid distant
others: the “bottom billion” of desperately impoverished people in the
developing world. 21 But it can also arise in connection with supposed
obligations to “live green,” reduce your carbon footprint, eat only locally
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/7457780/Frenchcontestants-torture-each-other-on-TV-Game-of-Death.html. For a video, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCamiWs-KMs&NR=1&feature=fvwp.
20
See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 110, 115-16 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1970). As Gilbert Harman
vividly puts it, “Consider your own present situation. You are reading a philosophical
book on ethics. There are many courses of action open to you that would have much
greater social utility….According to utilitarianism, therefore, you are not now doing what
you ought morally to be doing and this will continue to be true through your life [unless
you drop everything and devote yourself to life-saving activities].” GILBERT HARMAN,
THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 157 (1977).
21
Perhaps the best-known example of a moral argument that invites the demandingness
objection is Peter Singer’s famous Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
229 (1972), which argues that residents of wealthy countries have stringent moral
obligations to contribute to famine relief to a point far beyond anything we ordinarily
recognize. One well-known attempt to work out the demandingness objection is SAMUEL
SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (1982); a recent effort in the context
of global aid is GARRETT CULLITY, THE MORAL DEMANDS OF AFFLUENCE (2004).
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grown vegetables, avoid products made by child laborers, and the like. 22
Who wants to spend hours each week finding out where your vegetables
come from? There are strong arguments that the demandingness objection
really does offer a legitimate critique of overbearing moral obligations.
Plainly, the demandingness objection bears a family resemblance to the
objection that a moral theory imposes unrealistic demands on agents.
Would it be inconsistent to accept the demandingness objection but not the
unrealism objection?
I think not, because the two objections are less related than they seem.
In its basic form, the demandingness objection arises in connection with
obligations that seem to know no bounds—paradigmatically, “positive”
obligations to aid others. You can always spare another dollar to the
needy; you can always volunteer another evening. (Oscar Wilde
supposedly said that the trouble with socialism is that it takes up too many
evenings.) Here, the impossibility of cabining the obligation seems like a
strong objection to regarding it as a legitimate moral expectation. But
theories of legal ethics like Simon’s and mine are not like this. They don’t
feature positive obligations or obligations to aid others at their core; and
they don’t impose Obligations Without Borders. 23 They are unrealistic in
a different sense, namely that they may create awkward moments of
saying no to clients and partners on a more frequent (but not superfrequent) basis than lawyers have to do now.
Awkward moments, though, are hardly an objection to a view of
lawyers’ ethics, and they do not support the suspicion that an ethical view
that generates awkward moments is unrealistic. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct are filled with rules that contemplate awkward
moments. A lawyer whose client commits perjury must urge the client to
voluntarily rectify it, letting the client know that if she doesn’t the lawyer
will. 24 A lawyer “should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the
prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.”25 Lawyers must
tell people who pay their fees to represent a third party that the fee-payer
has absolutely no say in the representation. 26 Corporate counsel
sometimes has to give “Miranda warnings” to powerful executives, telling
them that she represents the company, not the executives, and won’t
necessarily keep the executives’ confidences. 27 Likewise, corporate
22

Judith Lichtenberg, Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the “New Harms,” 120
ETHICS (forthcoming April 2010)(page proofs on file with author).
23
I consider and respond to versions of the demandingness and unrealism objections in
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 139-44 (1988), in the section
titled “Is It Too Much to Ask?”.
24
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) cmt. 10 (2007) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES].
25
MODEL RULES R. 2.1 cmt. 1.
26
See MODEL RULES R. 5.4(c).
27
See MODEL RULES R. 1.13(f).
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counsel may have to go over the head of her boss to report misconduct to
higher authority within the corporation. 28 Law firm associates must refuse
partners who tell them to do things that the associate knows to be unlawful
or unethical, for example backdating a document to cover up the partner’s
missing a deadline. 29 A lawyer must blow the whistle to disciplinary
authorities if she “knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to
that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects”; that includes lawyers in her own firm. 30 So even the regulatory
framework that Woolley and Wendel believe lies at the heart of legal
ethics is unrealistic in the sense that it can require lawyers to have very
difficult conversations, the kind that leave you sleepless the night before
and make your heart pound when you pick up the telephone.
None of this is to say that worries about realism play no part in
ethics. Sometimes we excuse people for doing the wrong thing in the face
of psychological pressure. This is equivalent to excusing them because—
given their personality and the psychological pressure they are under—
holding them to a rigorous moral standard is unrealistic. But excuses
cannot become so universal that they amount to a blanket “Get Out of
Conscience Free” card, as they would if the charge of “being
psychologically unrealistic” were invariably allowed to pare back the
scope of obligation. In my own analysis of the Milgram experiments, I
distinguish between situations in which psychological pressure can excuse
wrongful behavior from those in which it cannot on the basis of whether
the psychological disposition exploited by the pressure is morally
creditable or morally discreditable. 31 Whether or not my analysis is

28

See MODEL RULES R. 1.13(b).
See MODEL RULES R. 5.2(a); see also MODEL RULES R. 8.4(c).
30
MODEL RULES R. 8.3(a).
31
LUBAN, supra note 18, at 253-60. The inspiration behind this distinction is Victoria
Nourse’s analysis of the heat-of-passion defense in criminal law, which can mitigate
murder charges to manslaughter. Nourse proposes that the heat-of-passion defense is
legitimately available to the parent who shoots his daughter’s rapist, but should not be
available to the man who shoots his girlfriend when she announces that she is leaving
him. Of course the homicide is wrong in both cases. But the murderous disposition in
the former case tracks a legitimate moral judgment that the rapist deserves punishment; in
the latter case, the murderous disposition tracks an illegitimate moral judgment that his
girlfriend is a kind of property that has no right to leave him. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s
Progress, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1390-93 (1997). On my analysis, deference to authority in
the Milgram scenario can ultimately be traced to a morally discreditable disposition to
value our own favorable self-image to an excessive degree. That is because I follow
Milgram in diagnosing the obedience phenomenon as a consequence of the step-by-step
increments in the shocks. For a subject to break off at a high level would involve
recognition by the subject that the nearly-as-high shocks he or she had been
administering are wrong, and that would be admitting horrible moral error. “For,” as
Milgram writes, “if he breaks off, he must say to himself: ‘Everything I have done to this
29
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correct, it seems clear that some distinction must be drawn between ethical
theories that are objectionably unrealistic and those about which the
response to the charge of unrealism must be: “Tough luck: realistic or
not, this is what morality requires.” In either case, psychological
unrealism properly belongs in a theory of excuses, not in the set of criteria
for evaluating ethical theories.
A related objection to using unrealism as a criterion for criticizing
moral theories is that it may lead us to set our sights too low. There is a
familiar argument in criminal law that publicizing the defense of duress
would make people less reluctant to give in to pressure to commit crime
(because they know the defense is available), and thus would lead to too
much crime. 32
I am suggesting an analogous concern here: that
overemphasis on people’s psychological resistance to moral requirements
will lead us to conclude that lawyers are never obligated to follow them.
Finally, I’d like to reemphasize a point I made earlier in connection
with Woolley and Wendel’s critique of Simon. Part of what makes
complying with so-called “high commitment” theories of legal ethics 33
psychologically difficult is this: we imagine that the lawyer who adopts
Simon’s view or mine is all alone in a law firm where nobody else has
adopted the same view. Of course it is psychologically difficult being the
lone dissenter. But perhaps the right question is not, “Is it psychologically
realistic for a lawyer to follow Luban’s or Simon’s injunctions in a legal
environment where other lawyers mostly accept the standard conception?”
Perhaps a better question is, “Is it psychologically realistic for a lawyer to
follow Luban’s or Simon’s injunctions in a legal environment where the
other lawyers mostly accept ‘high commitment’ ethics?”
This observation suggests that the best focus on ethical reformers is on
institutions and laws, not individual moral exhortation of lawyers (of
course the two are not mutually exclusive)—a point that Woolley and
Wendel themselves make. 34 As Judith Lichtenberg has argued, perhaps
the time has come to stop arguing about moral demandingness and,
instead, ask how institutions can harness psychology on behalf of high

point is bad, and I now acknowledge it by breaking off.’ But, if he goes on, he is
reassured about his past performance.” MILGRAM, supra note 18, at 149.
32
Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 632-34 (1984).
33
The term is Simon’s: William H. Simon, Who Needs the Bar?: Professionalism
Without Monopoly, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 639, 654-55 (2003) (referring to “ethics
reflecting a high level of commitment to third party and public interests”). Both his
ethical theory and mine would qualify as “high commitment” in this sense.
34
See Woolley & Wendel, supra note 1, at 37.
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commitment ethics. 35
One way to do this is by changing ethics regulations and other laws so
that morally difficult behavior is backed by the force of law, and lawyers
can tell clients or others, “I could lose my license for doing that….”
Woolley and Wendel mention the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with its “reporting
up the line” requirement for lawyers confronting possible client fraud. 36
They might also have noted that Sarbanes-Oxley drove the American Bar
Association to amend Model Rule 1.13(b) so it conforms to Soxley’s
requirement. In recent years, other rule changes have brought the Model
Rules into closer alignment with proposals of “high commitment”
ethicists—for example, by broadening MR 1.6(b) to include
confidentiality exceptions ranging over a wider category of client
wrongdoing, and adding MR 3.8(g) and (h) to make prosecutors reveal
evidence of wrongful convictions.
These amendments raise an interesting question: how did the bar
decide that the new rules are superior to their predecessors? In my
opinion, it is no coincidence that these recent rule changes all align with
high commitment ethics, nor that they mostly align with common (i.e.,
extra-professional or “lay”) morality. Under common morality, it is
wrong for a lawyer to keep confidential the knowledge that a client is
about to swindle someone out of their life savings, and it is wrong that a
prosecutor might conceal new evidence that an innocent person is rotting
in prison. On my account of legal ethics, the gap between professional
morality and common morality should shrink, and in this sense the new
regulations reflect right answers. It is noteworthy that the organized bar
has not always agreed, and in the case of broadening exceptions to
confidentiality, the bar notoriously dug its heels in for decades to defend
the wrong answer. One virtue of revisionary conceptions of ethics is that
they may provide criteria and perhaps even impetus for law reform that a
legal ethics centering on “civil obedience” to existing regulations does not.
C. REALISM AND DETERMINISM

Ultimately, the main criticism that ethical theories such as Simon’s
and mine are unrealistic seems to be that the facts of psychology set limits
to moral choice. A fundamental difference between Woolley and
Wendel’s theory of agency and my own is that they appear to be
determinists while I am not. They are less than entirely clear on this issue.
At one point they discuss with approval psychologist David Matsumoto’s
claim that a “complex interaction of forces … determine how individuals
35

Judith Lichtenberg, Famine, Affluence, and Psychology, in PETER SINGER, UNDER
FIRE: THE MORAL ICONOCLAST FACES HIS CRITICS 229 (Jeffrey A. Schaler ed., 2009);
but see Peter Singer, Reply by Peter Singer, in id. at 259.
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actually think or behave at any particular moment in time. Situational
factors and personality together determine behavior….” 37 This is the
language of determinism.
Later in the same paragraph, Woolley and Wendel amend
Matsumoto’s “situation plus personality determine behavior” model to a
somewhat more complex one, adding “that it is not only personality,
morality and/or situation that will determine that individual’s actions,” but
also “affective states,” 38 that is, emotional states. In one way, this is
simply another version of determinism—affective states and morality join
with personality and situation to determine behavior. But the claim is a bit
more than that, because Woolley and Wendel include morality among the
factors that “affect how she responds to a particular circumstance, and
how she chooses to act in that circumstance.” 39 Here they sound less
determinist, because they speak not only of “how she responds” but also
“how she chooses,” and apparently morality affects how she chooses.
Though it has overtones of determinism, this is closer to the language of
free will.
I regard the entire subject of ethics as having to do with choice, and
thinking about choice—that is, about what I should choose, here and
now—requires me to suppose that I can make a choice. That is the
practical standpoint, and I accept Kant’s argument that adopting the
practical standpoint requires us to postulate our own freedom to choose. 40
Viewed from the practical standpoint, morality is not just one
deterministic factor among others, bumping me wherever the forces
resolve. Rather, morality is something that lays a claim on me, which I
must decide whether to honor or not. Morality enters the stage precisely
when determinism exits, at the moment when we adopt the practical
standpoint and try to puzzle out the right thing to do.
37
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II. “FUNCTIONAL” AND “DESIRABLE”
Recall that Woolley and Wendel aim to evaluate conceptions of how a
lawyer must be according to whether they are realistic, functional, and
desirable. Having discussed the criterion of realism, I now turn to the
questions of whether Simon’s theory or mine presupposes a lawyer with a
dysfunctional or undesirable personality. My answer is no.
A. “FUNCTIONAL”

I take it that by asking whether “how a lawyer must be” under a given
ethical theory is functional, they mean to ask whether a lawyer who is
“like that” will function well in typical workplace settings, where
“function well” means two things: well for the lawyer and well for the
organization. They obviously think that the answer is no for Simon. They
portray the ideal lawyer in Simon’s ethics as a maverick who does not
play well with others. She is “disagreeable,” and may even be “incapable
of a healthy existence within an institutional context.” 41 They may think
the answer is no for me as well. For, like Simon, my lawyer “is extremely
mistrustful of claims of authority to obedience,” 42 and she “will be
required to think and justify her actions in terms of a conceptual
vocabulary that is disfavored in the environment in which she works,”
because she uses the language of morality, to which large-firm lawyers are
distinctively averse. 43
Now in one way these arguments are similar to the argument about
psychological realism: they presuppose that the “high commitment”
lawyer is working in a law firm staffed almost entirely by non-high
commitment lawyers. But it is not clear that asking about functionality
under this assumption is the right question. As suggested earlier, Woolley
and Wendel should ask whether the high commitment lawyer is functional
in a law firm of the like minded.
After all, if an institution is designed so that functioning ethically
within it requires undesirable traits, why should we use this as a criticism
of the ethical theory rather than a criticism of the organization? The years
framed by the Enron collapse on one end and the financial crash on the
other were filled with organizations that rewarded irresponsibility, risk
41
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taking, greed, and dishonesty. It may be that honesty is not “functional” in
such an institution, but why think that is a strike against honesty rather
than a strike against the institution?
Woolley and Wendel might respond that no organization can tolerate
employees who are habitually mistrustful of authority and are willing to
break the rules. However, I don’t think matters are so clear.
On the first point, I find Woolley and Wendel’s description of my own
view as mistrustful of authority slightly misleading because it is
ambiguous. I do not mean that those who run organizations are usually
bad enough to warrant mistrust—that would be a baseless and paranoid
thing to believe, and I nowhere assert it. Rather, I believe that the division
of labor and knowledge in complex organizations, combined with wellknown organizational dynamics such as “groupthink,” can lead to
organizational misdeeds that nobody in the organization recognizes as
such. 44 Lawyers should mistrust authority only in the sense that they
should try to become aware of whether their own judgment has become
unhinged by the organization’s culture or structure; in this sense,
mistrusting authority is the flip side of a certain kind of self-mistrust: the
self-scrutiny and skepticism of which Socrates is the exemplar—the
simple commandment to stop and think. 45 Can an organization tolerate
people who stop and think? I see no reason why not; a better question is
whether organizations can tolerate people who don’t.
What about people prepared to break rules? That is a harder question,
and the answer will turn on the nature and purpose of the organization—
some require tighter chains of command and greater obedience than
others. This is more than I can go into here. Suffice it to note that even
armies require soldiers to disobey orders if they are manifestly illegal, and
often encourage improvisation and exercise of judgment among officers in
the field. Law firms obviously have looser chains of command than
armies and generally provide lawyers with significant autonomy. I am
unpersuaded that either the organizational structure of law firms or the
regulatory system would be damaged by lawyers who exercise
independent moral as well as professional judgment.
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Woolley and Wendel write, “Assuming it is possible to reform the
cultures of law firms, government offices, and in-house legal departments,
the last thing one would want in a lawyer is a disposition to regard
established rules and procedures as optional guidelines, to be disregarded
whenever the lawyer believed justice or morality would be better
served.” 46 This is an ingenious argument, which seems to turn the tables
on soi disant ethics reformers like Simon and me by showing that our
theories may actually be the enemies of successful reform. But it is not a
sound argument, because it begs crucial questions.
First, it begs the question of whether the best way to reform
organizational culture would in fact be to create channels for lawyers to
exercise greater independent moral judgment; Woolley and Wendel seem
to assume that the answer is no, but it is not obvious why. Second,
Woolley and Wendel’s argument begs the question whether the reformed
organization would be more just and moral, so that the need to disregard
procedures would diminish and the problem they raise become less urgent.
Again, they apparently assume that the answer is no—although it is
unclear in that case what the “reform” was meant to accomplish. Third,
they assume that the reform is thorough enough “that following the
procedures will do better in the long run, as compared with relying on the
judgment of individuals.” 47 That is not true of all reforms, and Woolley
and Wendel have not actually shown that it is true of any. Fourth, and
most obviously, the argument starts with the “assume a can opener”
nonchalance often attributed to economists: “Assuming it is possible to
reform the cultures….” What if the cultures have not been reformed, or
not reformed adequately? Do we still want lawyers who follow orders and
stick to the rules? Why is that “functional”?
B. “DESIRABLE”

Finally, Woolley and Wendel suggest that the personality traits and
dispositions that go with high commitment ethics may be undesirable.
“The point here is not to ask whether the acts prescribed, if accomplished,
would be desirable. But it is to ask whether the type of lawyer who would
be able to accomplish those acts in a given case is the type of lawyer we
would want to have across every case, across the totality of the legal
system as a whole.” 48
This is indeed an intriguing and important question, but unfortunately
Woolley and Wendel do not answer it. Instead, they argue that the type of
lawyer presupposed by Simon is rare—“ a complex of personal
46
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48
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characteristics that occurs only infrequently, in the form of exceptionally
courageous and individualistic people.” 49 This is not an argument that
Simon’s ideal lawyer’s traits are undesirable. On the contrary, it is an
argument that they are more desirable than we dare hope.
The nearest that Woolley and Wendel come to arguing that the ideal is
undesirable is this: “the type of person who can resist the pressures of
institutional compliance, cannot function easily within an institution. Her
dispositional capacity to resist institutional compliance makes institutional
compliance something she cannot do well or easily.”50 On its face, this
seems plausible; but on closer reflection, I am not convinced.
Note first that Woolley and Wendel seem to equate desirable
personality traits with those that facilitate institutional compliance. Surely
that is not true of all institutions. Indeed, this seems like an argument
about functionality (in the sense discussed earlier) rather than desirability.
More importantly, Woolley and Wendel seem to be trading on an
equivocation. They refer to a lawyer’s “dispositional capacity to resist
institutional compliance.” Which is it, disposition or capacity? My
theory, like Simon’s, does assume a capacity to resist institutional
compliance when morality or justice requires it. But it doesn’t assume a
disposition to resist institutional compliance, in the everyday sense of
being a contrarian, a know-it-all, a temperamental anarchist, a pain in the
neck. Institutional compliance probably is something that the House
Contrarian “cannot do well or easily,” but my version of moral activism
doesn’t require you to be the House Contrarian, and I don’t think Simon’s
theory does either. Blurring together disposition and capacity into
“dispositional capacity” makes their argument look plausible, but it
conceals a logical jump from the proposition that a lawyer has the capacity
to resist institutional compliance (when she should) to the proposition that
she has a disposition to do so even when she shouldn’t. Nothing entitles
them to the jump.
The word “disposition” is something of a term of art within both
philosophy and psychology. In ordinary language, we usually use the
word to refer to someone’s overall personality, as in the sentence “She has
a sunny disposition.” In philosophy, by contrast, a disposition is
understood in a more fine-grained way as a propensity to behave in a
specific way: for example, ordinary window-glass has a disposition (i.e.
propensity) to shatter when struck by a flying brick. Human dispositions
in this sense are psychological states linking act or behavior types to
specific stimuli, as in this kind of ordinary language usage: “He tends to
lose it (i.e. has a disposition to become irrational) when he sees his exwife with another man.” Here, disposition-talk is not a broad brush
49
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description of someone’s overall character, but rather a narrow
explanation of particular behavior. 51
Ethicists typically use the term “dispositions” to describe something in
between the broad and the narrow: character traits such as cautiousness or
its opposite, recklessness; and, especially, character traits that are morally
significant, such as courage or honesty (or their opposites, spinelessness
and mendacity). These are what we ordinarily label virtues and vices;
philosophically, the idea of regarding virtues as dispositions to perform
acts of a certain kind (e.g., courageous or honest acts) derives from
Aristotle. 52 They are “dispositions” in the philosophical sense of
propensities to behave in certain ways, but they span whole categories of
behavior rather than highly specific behaviors like “losing it when he sees
his ex-wife with another man.” 53
Woolley and Wendel have somewhat contradictory views about the
ethicist’s and psychologist’s in-between notion of dispositions: at one
point in their article they criticize the notion of moral character, which
seems “neither identifiable nor predictive of conduct.” 54 Earlier, however,
they define dispositions—which, as we’ve seen, belong to the apparatus of
their own favored theory—as “[u]niversal dispositions such as courage,
honesty, justice, respect for dignity and equality of others, as well as role
dispositions or virtues, such as zealousness or fidelity.” 55 As far as I can
see, universal dispositions are character traits, nothing more and nothing
less, and I am left unsure whether Woolley and Wendel believe in them or
not; I assume they do, given their references to virtues such as courage and
fidelity.
A virtue like courage might plausibly be called a dispositional
capacity, because it is—in the sense just described—a disposition, and it is
also a capacity in the sense that it makes certain things possible. But what
is courage? The traditional understanding of courage, like other virtues, is
Aristotle’s assertion that it is the mean between two extremes (in this case
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cowardice and recklessness). 56 This is an important idea, because it
highlights what’s wrong with Woolley and Wendel’s argument that
someone with a dispositional capacity to resist authority will not be able to
obey authority well or easily. For an Aristotelian, the virtuous person is
one who obeys when it is appropriate and disobeys when it is appropriate,
and who knows one from the other. 57 That is the mean between being
stubbornly contrarian and being mindlessly servile. Woolley and Wendel
seem to presume that no such mean exists: if you have the capacity to
disobey on the right occasions, it will also be a disposition to disobey on
the wrong occasions. I don’t see why this conclusion is correct.
III. CONCLUSION
At one point, Woolley and Wendel write that “Simon and Luban…
rely on lawyers to be relentlessly focused on justice or morality.” 58 This
paints a grim picture of lawyers dragging justice and morality around like
a ball and chain, or perhaps burning with the fanatical, moralistic zeal of
latter-day Savonarolas. I certainly don’t see matters that way. By and
large, lawyers do not go frantically through life encountering one moral
dilemma after another like challenges in a video game. Lawyers like to
think that they do good in the world, and by and large I see no reason to
doubt it. My theory requires that lawyers be “relentlessly focused” on
morality only in the sense that they cannot hide behind their role or the
adversary system to release themselves from moral obligations that they
would have if they weren’t lawyers. They need be no more relentlessly
focused on morality than non-lawyers are.
In one sense, morality is relentless, in that it sets out ideals that
nobody fully complies with. I have done discreditable things in my life
and—without meaning any disrespect to the reader—so have you. Perfect
rectitude might actually require a kind of saintliness that is not necessarily
the all-round best life for a human being. 59 Where morality fits in with
art, sports, love, fun, and excitement—not to mention failure, heartbreak,
and other losses in a well-lived life—is not wholly obvious, and it is not
an issue that legal ethicists typically address. If you write a book on
ethics, setting out a moral ideal, it will inevitably appear that it demands
56
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saintliness and a relentless focus on morality. But that is an illusion born
simply of the fact that it is (after all) an ethics book. Perhaps, then, it is
not necessary to ask not only what a lawyer must do but what that means a
lawyer must be—because the things a lawyer must be are not exhausted by
ethics.

